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Incentives and Disincentives %28Full Study%29 |
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INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES
TO PROMOTE FAMILY PLANNING
A STUDY BY
THE FAMILY PLANNING FOUNDATION
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The Backgroun d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
Concept of Incontives and Disincentives and their Operation:
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The alarming increase in India's population and the unsuccessful attempts
to bring down the growth rate to anything like the norm aimed at has given rise
to unprecedentec! political, economic and sociological problems. The dimen-
sions and the diversity of these problems are pregnant with such dangers to our
body politic that they must be tackled on the proverbial war front. The whole
question of devising and implementing means of demographic control must be
studied from every possible angle. It is not enough to produce, provide and
recommend the various modes of preventing conception and "prematurelyterminat-
ing pregnancy. It is necessary to make the peopl~ aware of the urgency of the
matter and to create, by all possible means, a demand for medical, paramedical
and surgical methodS of reducing the stubborn growth of our population.
To achieve this objective, no .efforts should be spared. No device, no
strategem of proved efficacy is too expensive, for the very existence of our society
is at stake. !t his been observed thatthere is adequate awareness of the problem
among the more affluent and better educated individuals, but the less economi-
cally viable and uneducated masses are either indifferent to the information and
advice tendered to them in this behalf or positively resist the persuading, the
cajoling and the verbal threatening implicit in the enforcement of the family
planning scheme. This indifference and resistenceare the product of the economic '
considerations. The family needs.as many workers and wage earners as possible.
The low percentage of infant survival militates against the adoption of advice to
keep the family small. Who will look after the old people if they do not have
chHdren?
So, a sufficiently effective economic remedy must be administered to bring
about a healthy balanced and farseeing attitude 'toward the whole business of
population control, a remedy which will not only be readily accepted but will be
c;temandedandsought after by the massesat all levels. We believe and sincerely
hope that an adequate scheme of incentives and disincentives can provide the
remedy we are seeking.
TtieFamily Planning Foundation, a voluntary organisation for financing
research and promotional activity in population concerns examined the whole
question of incefltive and disincentives in terms of concept, operation and effective-
ness as well as its legal and ethical aspects. A group of eminent jurists, and
demographic experts made a close study of the matter, taking into consideration,
the acceptability, viability Clndthe legality of the various types of incentives and
disincentives which held promise of rewarding efficacy. The constitutional
aspect of imposing disincentives was examined in depth, and anything that could
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be interpreted as a deprivation of an individual's rights as a free citizen of India
was rejected. In the following pages the suggestions formulated as the result
of the deliberations and advice of the body of experts are set out. A perusal of
the list of persons consulted and who happily gave their advice will convince the
reader that the recommendations set out here have not been made lightly or with-
out diligent circumspection.
It is necessary to give the widest publicity to these measures, and it is hoped
that the Government and all who are concerned with the administration and
guidance of public, as well as private establishments, will give their earnest atten-
tion to them and adopt them to the extent and in the manner possible.
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The study entitled "Incentives and Disincentives to Promote Family
Planning" is the result of a joint effort of a number of people belonging to various
disciplines and backgrounds with the highest expertise related to the subject.
The Task Force constituted for the purpose consisted of-
Mr. Justice G. D. Khosla, Member, Governing Board,'
Family Planning Foundation
- Chairman
Mr. S. P. Ahuja, President, Centre for Research Planning and Action.
Mr. Raj Arole, Director Comprehensive Health and F.W. Project,
Jamkhed, Ahmednagar District (Maharashtra)
Mrs. S. M. Bhandare, Lawyer and Jurist. Vice Chairman,
Supreme Court Bar Association, New Delhi
Dr. P. N. Chuttani, Medical Educator, Ex-Director, Postgraduate
Institute of Medica/Education and Research, Chandigarh
Dr. M. E. Khan, Associate Director, Operations Research
Group, New Delhi
Professor R. K. Maru, Political Scientist, Indian Institute
of Management, Ahmedabad
Mr. P. Padmanabha, Registrar General, India
Dr. V. A. Pai Panandiker, Director, Centre for Policy.
Research, New Delhi
Mr. P. G. Ramachandran, Marketing & Management Expert, New Delhi
Dr. V. Ramalingaswami, Director General, Indian Council of
Medical Research, New Delhi
.
Professor J. D. Sethi, Economist (former Member, Planning
Commission), New Delhi
Dr. S. M. Shah, Adviser, Programme Evaluation, Planning
Commission, New Delhi
Dr. L. M. Singhvi, Jurist and Lawyer, Chairman, Supreme Court
Bar Association, New Delhi.
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INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES
TO PROMOTE FAMILY PLANNING
THE BACKG flOUND
1. The 198' Population Census of India has brought out the disturbing fact
that the Popul.tion growth is unabated with a growth rate of 24.75 per cent in
1971,:,81 whictl is not different from the rate of 24.80 recorded in the decade
1961-71. On. of the conclusions that these figures permit is that at the national
level, the famty planning programme has not yet succeeded in its quantitative
objective of cctltaining the burgeoning population though it might have achieved
some succeSll in increasing the awareness of the people and establishing a
delivery syster. of contraceptives. That the nation should find itself in a stage
when it has tq feed, clothe, house and educate 684 millions is surely a great dis-
appointment t'. those planners who three decades ago recognised that the pre-
vailing birth' r~,e of 41 per thousand was high and adumbrated an antinatalist
policy which \\/,as a historic first in the annals of government population policy.
2. With a Uopulation base of 700 million in 1982, the figure of a billion by
2000 AD is a ~efinite possibility with an annual growth rate of even 2 per cent.
It is not merel" a question of numbers; there are ominous structural implications
not to speak of the degradation in the physical quality of life. Indian population
would be muc~ larger before it can cease to grow because of what is called the
'momentum 01i population growth'. The legacy of past high birth rates is that
we have a bro~f:i..;based pyramidal age structure; with 40 per cent of the population
below the' agE! of 15 years ; with ever-growing coho~ moving from the early
teens into the $hild bearing ages and with potential fertility much higher than the
cohorts. leavin,' the reproductive age group. Even though declines in fertility
through effecti1.e family planning may begin to affect the numbers in the youngest
age groups, tt" child bearing population (already born) will continue to grow
for quite some !time. It is estimated that to the stock of 120 million couples at
present, there ••,ould be an addition of over 2 million couples each year. The family
planning pro~r"mme has not only to increase the contraception level of the couple
stock progressiVely but has also to provide for new entrants every year.
3. Short-ter., and ad-hoc demographic goals were frequently announced.
The ambition E~pressed in the First Five Year Plan (1954-59) was "to achieve a
reduction in bil,h rate to the extent necessary to stabilise the population at a level
consistent with the requirements of the national economy". The demographic
goal, which WI" made explicit in 1962 was the reduction in birth rate to 25 per
thousand by 1~73 - a target which was considered feasible on the basis of
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"Peoples' attitude towards smaH family". But despite the various strategies follow-
ed since the beginning of the family planning programme, the overall drop in birth
rate was only to the level of 33 per thousand* .....;iii reduction of 8 points in nearly
three decades. It is not intended to examine the causes of the failure of the pro-
gramme to achieve its stated objective as they are mixed up with the whole ques-
tion of population - development nexus on which there could be differences of
opinion as to cause and effect. Devoted planners could say that high population
fJrowth has nullified the gains of economic development, ardent sociologists could
bemoan that the requisite social change and mobility had not occurred. In
retrospect, however one point which is clear is that the family planning programme
as implemented so far has not been able to give effective contraceptive protection
to 40 per cent of the couples of reproductive age group which was the contracep-
tion level necessary to reduce the birth rate to 25 per thousand. The percentage
of couples effectively protected was not even 24 in 1982.
4. Moreover, the difficulties in undertaking a policy of fertility reduction in
India (with a high rate of population growth) increases rapidly as time passes since
many more families will need to be involved to obtain a percentage reduction in
fertility in future years equal to that which is attainable now with a smaller re-
producing population. For example, the officially accepted policy of reducing
the birth rate to 21 per thousand by 2000 AD would require protection by a modern
method of contraception to 60 per cent of the eligible couples. In absolute terms
the figures are even more staggering. We have to raise the couple. protection
from the level of 28 million in 1981-82 to over 90 million by the turn of the century,
i.e. an average increase of 3.5 millions per year in couple protection.
i. Set against such dimensions of performance requirement, suggestions that
a drastic reduction in infant mortality would increase the acceptance rates or that
social development should be speeded up, do not seem to match the task or the
time-frame, though they are. desirable goals in themselves and may have also a
synergistic influence in depressing high birth rates. What requires serious considera-
tion are measures which would directly raise the contraception acceptor rate in
the community from a level of 24 per cent of eligible couples in 1982 to 60 per cent
in less than two decades. While the ineffectiveness of the programme to influence
the fertility behavioqr should be corrected with due regard to human dignity and
basic rights, it is time to realise that population policies to limit fertility must go
beyond supplying contraceptive materials, services and information to individual
couples. A highly relevant but critical area is the adoption of policies by the
government and non-government bodies which seek directly to influence the
fertility behaviour of families by various incentives and disincentives.
6. The time factor definitely compounds our population problem and we there-
fore need a strong family planning programme effort in which a system of economic
* This Is the estimate for 1979 from Sample Registration System o.f Registrar General. But on
the basis of 1981 Census, the Registrar General has estimated the birth rate for the decade
1!J71-91 8S 3'.1.
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incentives and. disincentives have to come in. The lFamily Plannint!J Foundation
(FPF) therefore felt that the whole question of incentives and disincentives needed
a close look not only in terms of concept, nature, size, operation and effectiveness,
but also in regard to the legal and ethical implications. The Foundation prepared
a comprehensive note on incentives and disincentives and placed it before an
inter-disciplinary Task Force comprising leading medical experts, economist.,
demographers, administrators and jurists (Annex I).
7. . Fortunately the family planning programme is now regaining ground but
all too slowly in relation to the magnitude of the problem that confronts us. The
Prime Minister has called for revamping the family planning programme and
inaugurating the First Nationat Conference of the Indian Association Qf Parlia-
. mentarians on 25 May 1981 stated "we are always receptive to new ideas and
suggestions. Let us get together for consultations. Can we not agree on in-
.
centive and disincentives, on effective schemes and the beS! way to reach the
people". It is against this background that this note examines in the succeeding
paragraphs the role of incentives and disincentives in the "promotion of family
planning ona voluntary basis as a people's movement" as envisaged in the 20-
point programme and attempts to put forward a comprehensive scheme of in-
centives and disincentives which incorporates the major suggestions of the
Task Force.
CONCEPT OF INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES
AND THEIR OPERATION
Incentives
8. Incentives and disincentives are not completely new ideas in the Indian
family planning programme. .As early as 1956, Tamil Nadu gave private medical
practitioners a' subsidy of Rs. 25 to perform vasectomy on men with low incomes.
They were introduced in 1964 by the Central Government in the form of cash
payment (monetary compensation) to acceptors and motivators and in 1980
they were proposed to be linked to insurance and housing in the case of Central
Government employees. Some State Governments modified the scheme of
incentives and Disincentives in 1~76,'·the latter mostly directed towards employees
of the pubUc sector. Besides, the industrial houses such as Tatas and United
Planters Association of South India (UPASI) had implemented in.centive schemes
as· a part of the labour welfare schemes.
9. 'Incentive' may be defined as a tangible or intangible reward to an individual,
* couple, or other target group designed to induce specified fertility reducing be-
haviour. The incentives offered to individuals by government are of four types:
(a) incentives to acceptors from the general public;
* Dr. H. P. David, Director, Transnational Family Research Institute. Bathesda. U.S.A. (StUdies
in Family Planning, Vol 18. No.5. May 1982)
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(b) incentives to acceptors who are public servants;
(c incentives to public servants who motivate;
(d) incentives to providers of professional services.
10. How are the incentives expected to influence the individual acceptors?
Is reproductive behaviour 'adaptive'? There are various interpretations. The
government regarded the cash incentives as a compensation for loss of wages
and for the provision of diet and drugs to the acceptors. The cash incentives
were modest and varied from Rs. 100 to 200 and it is a moot question whether
by themselves they could induce the desired change in the behaviour of the
acceptor. The acceptors might have either reached already a decision on fertility
control on the basis of knowledge and motivation or responded to the pursuasion
of the local public servants who were keen to fulfil their quota of motivation and
get their own incentives or at least escape the penalties. It is not unlikely that in
the latter case, it is the public servant whose interest is served by the programme
and the acceptor is a 'tool'. Cash incentives are no substitute for motivation nor
should motivators relax their efforts on that score. Probably incentives provide a
support for low motivation of individual. Though isolated field trials and studies
have demonstrated the potential benefits of material incentives as an inducement
to control fertility, there is no sound psychological theory. The mechanism of
influence of incentives is not clear nor is the impact ptecisely measurable because
of synergism between factors. But the offer of incentives stimulates people to
talk about the family planning programme and thus it is helpful in promoting the
programme.
11. Prof. Donald J. Bogue* while examining policy implications of theory and
research on motivation and induced behavioural change for family planning
observes -
"the making of a payment to a person as an inducement to get him to go to a
famIly planning clinic or to accept a packet of pills has three possible theoretical
justifications:
(a) Simple conditioning;
(b) Operant conditioning (reinforcement of desired behaviour);
(c) Cognitive consistency - to justify his action the person changes his
attitude."
After a careful review of the conditions under which these three theories wqrk,
Prof. Bogue rejects the one-time reward as the desirable mode of inducing be-
haviour. But a relevant consideration is that the behaviour change induced by
incentives (assuming that it does so) is for the ultimate good of the indIvidual and
his family and is therefore not devoid of permanent values and long-term justifica-
tion. Acceptance of an incentive as a reward to change one's fertility behaviour
* Director, Community and Family Study Centre, University of Chicago. (Expert group on
Psychological Aspects of Fertility Behaviour, ESCAP,1974)
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is not monetary opportunism but one which confers benefits in the long-run
(though the acceptor may not be fully conscious) .. The undesirable aspects are
where the incentive scheme could be abused by the family planning functionaries
to achieve their own quota of target set. Resort to coercion of clients, cooking-
up of figures and low-quality of service either by recruiting ineligible persons or
by a ~sualness in rendering family planning services are the results of abuse.
The incentive scheme, therefore needs further rationalisation to make it a tool for
promoting family planning. In this context, it is relevant to point out that Kerala
which is one of the States with a successful family planning programme did not
introduce cash incentives. Apart from the high degre~ of social development,
particularly rural female literacy, the credibility of the family planning services were
probably the influential factors in promoting family planning. Further, if the family
planning programme is less officially-led and more public-based perhaps the full
meaning and potentiality of the incentives scheme could be realised.
12. It is in this context that the community or group incentives commend them-
selves. Under these, villages or identifiable communities are rewarded either
in cash or through a developmental programme for inducing couples of the area
to control their fertility. They probably operate in three directions:
(a) they generate community leadership which means increased popular
involvement;
(b) they confer benefits on the community which could be oriented
towards their development and well being on a long-term basis;
(c) the individual acceptor behaves in consonance with community interest
and is not vulnerable to offiCial pressures for achieving 'quotas'.
13. Community incentives have also been introduced by some states. Typical
of these are the institut!on of an award of Rs. 1 lakh for the Zilla Parishad adjudged
to be the best in the state in family planning performance, awards of Rs. 2.5,000
for the best Kshetra Samiti in every division and many awards of Rs. 10,000 each
for the best Gram Sabha in every district. In GUjarat, competition betweendis-
tricts brought in the Ministers, MPs and MLAs of the district thus providing political
consensus on family planning promotion. These amounts were to be used by
these bodies for creating capital assets such as schools or health centres or public
utility services such as wells, roads etc. Such group incentives take away the
criticism applied to individual cash incentives about 'allurement' or 'exploitation
of poverty'. The possibility of community incentives getting skewed in develop-
mental distribution should be recognized and safeguards provided. The Task
Force emphasized that to improve family planning, we have to concentrate on
people below the poverty line and ensure that the benefits actually reach them
instead of falling into the hands of the power group in the community. Incentives
system must touch the daily life of the people and if it is not implemented in 8 just
way the poor would become cynical.
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DISINCENTIVES
14. A 'disincentive' is a tangible or intangible negative sanction incurred by an
ifldividual, couple or other target group as a consequence of exceeding established
standards of reproductive behaviour (H. P. David, op. cit). like incentives,
disincentives also leave room for voluntary decision making. It is no coercion
becausethere is always the option for rejection. "The disincentive strategy assumes
that population growth is of sufficient importance to make it a concern of govern.•
mental policy, that the conventional family planning approach alone is not suffi-
cient and that government has a right to intervene in private behaviour to prevent
what it considers to be excessivefertility (K. Davis, 1978 in US House of Represen-
tatives, Select Committee hearings on population)". Disincentives are also per-
ceived as. having educational effects, serving as forceful reminders of officially
sanctioned family-size policies and oriented toward those who violate established
standards of reproductive behaviour. Disincentives can reinforce public percep-
tion of smaJl-famlly nonns and encourage rational decision making by emphasizing
cost-benefit factors without preventing couples from having additional children if
they wish ro pay the cost entailed or forego benefits.
-=.:"'.c~.,,:·:.-
.... _::.c:..
15' Opinion of the Task Force was divided on the question of disincentives.
One view was that it might infringe basic rights of individuals as disincentives
oould be punitive in nature. At the same time, it was felt that the child should
flot suffer the consequences of the irresponsible fertility behaviour of the parent
and that some 'preventive disincentives' were desirable. An unborn child has also
some rights and parents have no right to have a child If they cannot give that child
a reasonable chance of getting its general potentiality. Yet another view was
that if incentives are themselves made powerful, their absence would be a dis-
incentive. But it was argued whether mere absence of reward could produce
results without punishment. It was also mentioned that it is a biological pheno-
menon·that, for changing the ,-behaviouralperformance, mere absence of reward
without punishment is not effective. Disincentives for a class of Government
Employees was mentioned.
16. While the Central Government had not proposed a scheme of disincentives,
some State Governments had formulated a scheme of disincentives which were
mostly directed towards public servants. Annexure" gives a representative list
of disincentives. It is seen that many of the disincentives were punitive in
character for non-achievement of the 'quota' of motivation for sterilisation or
denial of existing rights. for public servants who exceeded the prescribed size of
family. The U.P. government is reported to have withdrawn all disincentives.
Admittedly, some of the disincentives directed against public servants affected
their service rights. But if judged in the proper context, some of the disincentives
could be rationalized. The main considerations are that disincentives should not
be arbitrary and should not punish parents for their past fertility behaviour nor
should it cause undue hardships for children born, in disregard of official policy.
Any scheme of disincentive must have a prospective application. and the con-
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cerned persons must be given sufficient time to shape their attitude in the long-
term interest of their family and larger interest of the community. Time is against
us in realising the national demographic goal of replacement level fertility by 2000
AD and if we now hesitate to introduce 'soft' meSSUles, the need for 'halde,'
meaSUles, a decade flom now may become inevitable.
17. An examination of the role of incentives and disincentives would not be
complete without a consideration of the target-approach to the family planning
programme. There has been an extreme view that incentives and disincentives
are concomitants of the target approach of family planning. Was a target-
approach necessary at all1 India like many other developing countries had
formulated its demographic goal in terms of specified reduction in crude birth rates
as a part of its development strategy. To achieve the demographic goals, these
countries had organized family planning programmes and in most cases set target
numbers of acceptors of different family planning methods to be recruited. Target
setting is a method of operationalizing a demographic target set In terms of a
reduction in the crude birth rate. On the demand side, it indicates dimensionally
the number of acceptors the programme must secure ovet a time-frame in order
that the demographic goal may be achieved. On the supply side, It assi$tS the
administrators of the programme to plan the procurement and distribution of the
~ontraceptives. If in the past the operational targets were not.achieved the blame
need not be on target setting alone, a greater share of the blame is on non-per-
formance. In 1981-82, many States have exceeded their target forsterilisation.
Maharashtra by 66 per cent, Gujarat by 47 per cent. Himachal Prodesh by 43 per
cent, Kerals by 21 per cent. Andhra Pradesh by 18 per cent. Punjab by 15. per cent,
Rajasthan by 11 per cent and Tamil Nadu by 4 per cent. Karnataka, Haryana,
Madhya pradesh, Orissa and West Bengal came close to the targets, while Bihar
achieved 56 per cent and U.P. barely 38 per cent of the targets. The programme
executives must seek new ways to improve the programme performance, keeping
in view the targets. Also with tho help of the targets .distributed to administrative
area,s, the monitoring and evaluation of the programme becomes easy.
18. Another criticism that is voiced is that target setting has stressed sterilisation
and consequently most of the incentives and disincentives revolve round sterilisa-
tion. Given the demographic objective, a certain number of acceptors under
each method would have to be recruited each year depending upon the 'contra-
ception mix'. With 35 per cent of the births being of the fourth and higher orders
(which could be regarded as a completed family), terminal methods are definitely
required to cover this segment of couples. A computer exercise carried out at the
International Institute of Population Studies, Bombay on behalf of the Working
Group on Population Policy constituted by the Planning Commission has indicated
the contraceptive levels needed under different mix of methods to take the nation
towards the goal of Net Reproduction Rate = 1 (implying a birth rate of 21 per
thou 'and) by 2000 AD, Three types of 'mix' were suggested: Lowprlority
sterilisation (1 :4 ratio between sterilisation and other methods), medium priority
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sterilisation (1:2 ratio) and high priority sterilisation (1:1 ratio). For example.
the required number of acceptors in 1985-86 are indicated in the table below:
Acceptors required in 1985-86
(in mil/ion)
Sterilisation
Other methods
Total
Low Sterilisation
Medium Sterilisa1ion
High Sterilisation
(1 :4)
(1 :2)
(1 :1)
4.0
16.0
20.0
4.7
9.6
14.3
5.1
5.1
10.2
19. It may be seen that when the desired number of sterilisation acceptors !s
reduced by a miHion, we have to recruit about 10 million acceptors under other
methods because of the low level of effective protection under temporary methods.
There are obvious infrastructural limitations in recruIting and servicing such large
number of clients, but at no stage would the number of sterilisation acceptors
exceed the number of acceptors of other methods.
20. Further, sterilisation in the context of a scheme of incentives and disincentives
affords a system of verification of performance and secures the. cost-effectiveness.
of the incentive scheme. An individual incentive scheme appears to have a better
justification for acceptors of sterilisation, firstly because it being a terminal method
the people are required to make a clear decision about the size of the family and
secondly, being a surgical method, it requires hospitalisation and after-care. In
temporary methocls, because of high discontinuation rates, one-tIme incentive
payments may be wasteful of resources. Also there could be a tendency on the
part of functionaries to exaggerate the figures without fear of being detected.
Also record keeping for such large and scattered clientele presents a problem.
This is however not to suggest that temporary methods should not be brought
under the purview of incentives. While incentives to sterilisation acceptors can
6uccessfully operate even on the basis of an individual who is properly screened,
incentives in the case of temporary or spacing methods may require a community
back-up or a defel1'ed payment basis (asin UPASI) so that the beneiciary periodically
confirms non-pregnancy to claim the instalment of benefit. Such a procedure
secures cost-effectiveness of the monetary inputs.
EXPERIMENTS IN ASIAN COUNTRIES:
21. Social and economic incentives and disincentives have been a part of policy
on fertility control in certain Asian countries. The Tianjin Industrial City Pro-
gramme in China is typical of such programmes throughout China:* Under this
programme, single-child certificate has been issued by the Municipal Revolutionary
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Council. This certificate records the name of the child, mother and father and the
place of employment. The advantages conferred by this certificate are:
(1) gives couple a priority for ass!gnment of living accommodation i
(2) assures the child admission to the Kindergarten (Admissions to which
are dificult since the appliants exceed the available seats) i
(3) mother with an only-child certificate can proceed directly to see a
doctor rat,her than waiting in the line;
(4) one child families normally receive a bonus (about Rs. 30/- each month)
to purchase food and clothing for the child;
(5) finally, this certificate is associated with prestige since the bearer and
her husband are perceived as persons with social responsibility.
Economic sanctions are recommended for couples who have a second child after
being r~warded for having one child:
(1) Ten per cent of the monthly wages would be deducted until the child
is 14 years old.
.
(2) The child is denied participation in the family's cooperative medical
programme.
(3) The mother would not be eligible for paid maternity leave.
(4) Workers who violate even the two child norm wiIJ be denied promotion
for two years.
However, the Tianjin programme does not rest for its success on incentives and
disincentives only. The delivery system of contraceptives is highly effective as
many men and women receive their contraceptive supplies at work. Where they
are not employed, they are registered and supplied contraceptive by a voluntary
community agent, generally an elderly retired woman in the community. By
combination of these methods, Tianjin has an impressive record of affording contra-
ceptive protection to nearly 85% of the eligible couples in 1979 when the total
population of the industrial city was estimated at 7.4 million.* 'IUD is the most
popular method (30%), followed by Oral Pills (24%), Sterilisation (18%) and
condoms (14%). Admittedly, China's programme, as is to be expected, has a
a strong ideological background. Tl)ere is publicity and guidance to family
- planning in the production brigades. In each production brigade, there is special
board of family planning headed by party secretary. Free supply of contraceptives
and services, equal pay for men and women, provision of nurserIes and kinder-
gartens are Iisted- as supportive measures in the plan for population control in
China, which has as its objective the reduction in growth rate to half-per cent by
1985.
* For entire China it is estimated that 80 million couples are regulating their fertilitY because of
widespread availabilitY of contraceptives combined with incentives end disincentives.
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22. "Some economists have calculated that nations with a surplus of unskilled
labour will save a substantial sum for each birth prevented and based on these
calculations, a number of plans have been tried to share this 'savings' with
couples who refrain from bearing additional children. Under such plans, countries
have tried different types of incentives on an experimental scale. The Govern-
ment of Philippines has experimented with varied incentives and disincentives
for promoting family planning and the population policy itself provides for the
examination of such a scheme in the context of legal and administrative policies
designed to bring about a harmonious balance between the size of the family
and socio-economic goals of the country. Incentives included pension plans,
insurance benefits, savings deposits and other social security benefits. No-
birth bonus was payable to female employees who do not utilize their maternity
leave for a certain number of years. Currently new initiatives linking income~
generating activities to reproductive behaviour are being discussed. In Sri Lanka
couples whose marriages were registered after January 1978 will be eligible
for a 10 per cent increase in pension if they have only two or fewer children, In
Indonesia trust funds were provided to the community at the beginning of the
programme rather than wait for a specific performance to be rewarded. Family
Planning acceptors could use these funds for launching income-generating pro-
Jects. The emphasis in Korea is on social support for the two-child fam!ly and
modifying the laws so as to discourage son-preference. The Government intends
to limit maternity leave and educational costs subsidies for families with two or
fewer children, while additional resident taxes will be levied on couple with more
than three children. The importance of people "seeing an immediate benefit from
family planning" is the basis of integrated community development in Thailand
in which the Community-Based Family Planning Services (CBFPS) is used as
"a spring-board for income-generatin'g or partially self-financed activities to en-
hance the quality of life". One disincentive was also introduced in 1979 under
which the living expense assistance paid to government employees (S30 per
child per year until 18th year was restricted to the first three children.
23. Experience of Asian countries shows that, "to be successful, programmes
using incentives, disincentives, or integrated community approach, will have to be
formulated as consistent, clearly defined and well communicated policies, res-
ponsive to devefopment needs and sensitive to local autonomy and values, with
dynamic leadership to obtain and nurture continued political backing" (H. P.
David, op. cit).
24. Population policies followed by Government are usually of two types:
Population-responsive policies and population-influencing policies. The former
are designed to ameliorate or overcome the effects of rapid population growth
(employment, food supply, housing etc.) while the latter seek to bring about a
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r'eduction in fertility, mortality and national growth rates and influence internal
migration. Family Planning programmes and other policies related to fertility
reduction. public health and nutrition programmes that lower mortality are in the
second. A scheme of incentives and disincentives is appropriately a population-
influencing policy.
25. Simone Veil, the Foreign Minister of France raises* a basic question, "Is
population policy a legitimate concern of the state 7" and answers by pointing out
that the basic responsibility of a state being the socio-economic development of
a country to secure the maximumwel/ being of its citizen (both present and future)
state concern in the demographic domain follows from that responsibility. People
may not be averse to the indirect influence of development on fertility but would
they approve direct interference 7 Thus the question is not one of legitimacy of the
population policy per se but the legitimacy of the methods of implementing the
policy.
26. A scheme of incentives and disincentives, whatever their necessity and
expediency should conform to legal and ethical, code in our democratic set up.
For this, the legal and ethical implications need to be studied against two dominant
and somewhat conflicting requirements:
(a) The emphasis placed by the World Population Conference - Plan of
Action (1974, Bucharest) and supported in other forums such as
Tehran proclamation on Human Rights (1968) and the Commonwealth
Parliamentarians Conference on Population in Colombo 1979 about
"the right of couple to decide freely and responsibly the number and
spacing of their children'" and the States ' responsibility "to make
availa,?,e information and education and the means for couples and
individuals to exercise this right".
(b) The excess fertility of individual couples though time is increasingly
passed on as a "burden' to the entire population. Does the state have
an obligation to protect society and the nation against excessive re-
production by individual couples 7
27. The points that need consideration against this twin-background are:
(a) How does the scheme of individual incentives and disincentives affect
the procreative freedom as a basic human right 7
(b) Are any obligations attached to this right 7
(c) Are human rights absolute; are not human rights inter-related 7
(d) How are rights of individuals circumscribed by rights of society under
the social view of law and life 7 Should individual freedom be absolute
or regulated in a social context 7
* Speech delivered on 'Human Rights, ideologies and population policies' at the meeting of
the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population. 1977, Mexico.
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28. A Study Committee of the National Academy of Sciences of USA has aptly
observed:
"True freedom to determine family size can be realised only if it is like
all other human freedoms tempered by the concern of the individual
for the rights and interests of others. The essence of the matter is to
protect both society and individual. In this instance society needs
protection from the undesirable effects of high fertility and the individual
needs protection from ignorance, coercion and inequitable access to
the technical resources of society."
Accordingly they recommend "government and private efforts should be expanded
to accelerate the trend towards the smaller family and the sense of individual
responsibility towards society". There is no real freedom without responsibility
or knowledge. Freedom to procreate therefore presupposes that parents have
thought about the children for whom they will be responsible and that they accept
such responsibiHty.
29. Assuming that the nature of a family planning programme was simply to
assist the household in implementing its own plan to achieve an "optimal income
- leisure - children configuration; the question arises how to induce families
which appear to benefit from large number of children to take part in family
planning programme which will benefit society as a whole. Two approaches are
the use of coercion and the use of incentives. In this context incentives are a
payment made by society to a family which has foregone the 'welfare' of having
additional children by practising contraception. The benefits and costs for society
as a whole of a child added in one family will be different from those of parents
and these differences "justify social intervention to influence the fertiiity behaviour
of parents."
30. While the freedom of a couple to make reproductive decisions must be
"tempered by the concern for the rights and interests of others" the "first ahd most
obvious interest Is to protect the children already born within the family." If the
argument is that a policy of government providing incentives to contraceptors
interferes with the basic right of procreative freedom of the couple, what is the
position of the basic right of the new born and of the progeny in regard to education,
employment etc. which the state has to provide within the limited financial re-
sources. Should the state take on the social burden of high parity children which
are unplanned and unwanted pregnancies at least from the emotional and psycho-
logical view of I 'child' 7 If procreative freedom is a human right, how many
couples bring forth children conscious of and in exercise of such a right 7 If it is
assumed that parents ordinarily have no conscious rationality beyond the second
or third child (containing both sexes) does the state have a right to take pre-
emptive action to prevent births beyond the se(l:ond or third child by offering in-
centives to acceptors or applying disincentives for 'irresponsible' fertility behaviour
in terms of societal norms 7 In the name of procreative freedom ~sa basic right,
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do -parents have an unquestioned right to impose on the coming generation of
human beings a handicap by their very numbers, in a limited resource situation?
If children provide both economic and psychic or social benefits to their parents,
they also produce 'costs' to the' State on pregnancy, delivery, feeding, clothing,
housing, medical care etc.
31. Is it not exploitation, if parents try to get economic gains from their progeny
through child labour and is it not appropriate for the State to enact laws prohibiting
child labour or making education compulsory so that parents lose the benefits of
their children's earnings and on the other hand incur costs to support them? If it
is argued that there is a pro-natalist value orientation in a traditional society which
places a premium on a large family, is it not arguable that family planning presents
an alternative to these traditional values. Family planning is to be viewed not as a
mere negative process of preventing births but in its positive role as a process of
human development. Further the submarginal labour which the children contri-
bute can be performed by the surplus labour available in the community. Cannot
the State adopt a policy of disincentives that reduces the benefits and increase
the costs to parents of having children beyond two or three and at the same time
provide social security, old-age insurance and similar incentive schemes which
lessen the economic incentive for having children beyond a prescribed number or
provide priority health-care and nutrition programme which reduce the mortality
and morbidity of children already born and improve the physical quality of life? If
social security is provided would it not change the value orientation toward children
- particularly son-preference? Are not such incentives and disincentives consis-
tent with human dignity (including the dignity of the unwanted and neglected
babies) and distributive justice? In a country of limited resources, it is not
reasonable for the government to warn the parents sufficiently in advance about
free education not being available for the third and higher order children and on
the other hand provide education bonus to those who adopt a two-child norm?
Once the options open to couples are clearly spelt out, is not the voluntary nature
of the programme still maintained? It would appear to be a minimum restriction
on individual freedom if the government were to build gradually the peoples'
attitude towards a small family norm by judicious use of incentives. In sum, it
appears that a programme of incentives and disincentives to raise the level of
peoples' consciousness and to help voluntary acceptance may be in order.
32. Is freedom to procreate the only ethical imperative in population policy?
Is not "freedom" a matter of psychological conditioning to social norms and
common well-being? If a person's right to marry is circumscribed by the law
relating to minimum age at marriage, because the objective of the law is to promote
the health of the mother and the child and if it is legal and ethical to adopt medical
termination of pregnancy (MTP) in the interest of mother's health, is not such a
social view of law and life applicable to the prevention of "excess" birth in the
interest of welfare of children already born in a poor family? It is worth
noting that children below 15 years are concentrated (55 per cent) in
families with a per capita monthly expenditure of less than Rs. 51. How else do
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we tackle the vicious circle of poverty and high fertility? A conference of ulemas
in Bangladesh 22-24 March 1982 emphasized that according to the Koran the
parents have the mandatory responsibility to ensure proper health education and
training for each of their children. 'Population control did not mean genocide of
the unborn, rather lack of it meant a brutality against posterity'. The first National
Conference of Indian Association of Parliamentarians for problems of Population
and Development (IAPPD) adopted in May 1981 a Declara~ion that family planning
must be recognized as a basic human right and that a child's right not to be born
to a life of degradation must be respected fully.
33. As Simone Veil observes "sexuality7' and reproduction is increasingly con-
sidered the responsibility of the couple alone, whereas responsibility for the conse-
quences of reproduction - that is, for the child's - is increasingly socialized.
How then do we protect the privacy of adults, the autonomy of each of the marital
partners, and the many rights of the child for which the state is responsible: the
right to education, to good health, to culture and so on? The basic question is
how to reconcile two categories of rights: the social rights or the rights "to be
obtained" as opposed to the basic rights "to do". Can the state in developing
social rights risk jeopardising fundamental rights. Simone Veil concludes that
while it is legitimate for the state to intervene in the domain of population when
population change produces imbalances, in policy implementation, the state must
protect the fundamental rights of individuals while ensuring the social rights of the
people. It is therefore essential that consistent with this twin responsibility of the
state to the individual and to the society, coercion and punitive elements should
not enter into the methods of intervention in the demographic domain.
34. Lester R. Brown, President, World Watch Institute in his report 'Twentytwo
Dimensions of the Population Problem'* observes under the Section on 'Individual
Freedom' that "as more and more people require space and resources on this
planet, more and more rules and regulations are required to supervise individual
use of the earth's resources for the common good and sums-up by emphasizing
that "population-induced scarcity makes muddling through in a basically laissez-
faire socio-economic system no longer tolerable or even possible. In a crowded
world menaced by ecological stresses and resource scarcities, the only alternative
to self-discipline in consumption and procreation may be a situation in which the
grip of planning and social control will by necessity become more and
more complete". Thus the alternative to self-discipline in procreation is social
control.
35. A certain inconsistency in policy would remain as long as the interests of the
individuals are not synonymous with that of the state. In considering the legitimacy·
of the state action, it has to be recognised that human rights per se have no meaning
without the existence of the conditions and environment in which the exercise of
such rights has a purpose and relevance. Likewise, economic and social rights
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will have a meaning for the population only if their basic minimum needs are met by
the society or.by government. For example, the right to good health has no mean-
ing without the state insisting on compulsory vaccination and providing the means.
In the same way, the state in its endeavour to reach a level of development nece-
ssary for the wetfare of the people has a responsibility to modify the conditions
under which individuals and couples make choices about fertility behaviour. Here
again Simone Veil comments that incentives are preferable to penalties and no
course of action should be imposed. Compulsory sterilisation and other involun-
tary fertility control measures represent gross violation of individual freedom. In
the case of punitive measures, one must be sure that the person affected is the one
responsible for the undesirable procreative behaviour. We should scrupulously
avoid making the child suffer the brunt of the penalty or penalising the parents
who act only from ignorance.
36. The Jurists on the Task Force were of the view that there is need to draw up
a concise and meaningful programme of incentives which can apply to the masses,
while disincentives should be limited to those which could be introduced without
infringing the fundamental rights. In their view, it would be difficult to draw a
line ab initio to distinguish between those who benefit from incentives and those
who are losers. The legal aspects could be considered by the court only on specific
and individual cases when' the nexus between what is given and what is denied is
discovered. Any scheme of incentives and disincentives should be more personal
to the parent and should not affect the rights of the children.
•
37. On the legitimacy of State action, the jurists felt that it could be considered
against two sets of parameters: the voluntary frame and the reasonable frame.
Though a State has responsibility towards a citizen of today as well as of ,the future,
any action by the State would be judged not merely in terms of intentions but also
of the consequenCe. For example, if, as a disincentive, it is intended to penalize a
parent for producing a third or fourth child, by way of denial of educational rights
of those children, such a consequence for the child is open to question. The
jurists opined that in devising a scheme of incentives and disincentives, emphasis
should be on affirmative action with a reasonable margIn. For example, instead of
penalising the third or fourth child (by denial of education), the scheme could
envisage preferential treatment for the first and second child by stipulating that for
a certain percentage of seats in educational institution, preference would be given
to the first and second child. Because of such requirements, the jurists felt that
disincentives cannot be introduced in any arbitrary manner; they have to be
moderately conceived and implemented. An example of disincentives which is
personal to the parent (and does not directly affect the child) is to charge the
mothers progressively for maternity assistance.'
38. On the question of group and community incentives, the Jurists felt that they
could largely be classified as affirmative action by government and could therefore
be adopted. For any successful scheme, it would be necessary to be clear about
the target to which the scheme has to be beamed.
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39. The prefequisites of any scheme of incentives and disincentives is, therefore;
a broad based, easily accessible and effective information and education pro-
gramme concerning the action proposed by the State to limit the size of individual
families over a time-frame and a clear indication of the, options that are before
the people to choose from. This may not be a legal measure but an executive
measure designed to provide a basis for a scheme of incentives and disincentives.
In this way the voluntary nature of the programme is still maintained and what is
even more, the choice is made by people with a full knowledge of the options.
Community .Ieaders and work-groups can discuss the options, advise their mem-
bers about the choice and ensure implementation. Similarly, Panchayat Samitis,
Women's clubs, Co-operatives, Trade Unions and voluntary organisations can give
not only publicity but advise their members on the choice of options. It is such
actions over a wide-front that would make family planning in India a peoples'
movement. Emphasizing that a scheme of incentives requires for its success a
good communication base, the Task Force observed that what went wrong with
the earlier scheme of incentives was due to its rigidity and closeness. We want an
open atmosphere and continued dialogue in using an incentive scheme to recruit
acceptors. Effective methods of communication need to be developed in rural
areas and the communication strategy should tell the people how family planning
is beneficial.
40. A scheme of incentives and disincentives, as they had operated in the past,
has been criticised as being discriminatory or exploitative of a group - the public
servant. This raises a basic question: does an employer have a special right to
regulate the fertility of the employee under threat of curtailment of their rights?
Is the State not justified in expecting from a public servant a higher degree of social
consciousness and self-control in procreative freedom and does this tantamount
to discrimination? On the other hand if a State rewards public servants who are
acceptors of family planning, is not dil'c·iminatory against acceptors from the
public who have no scope for such rewards. A rational argument could be that a
public servant has certain additional rights derived from his occupational status
over and above the basic rights as a citizen and that if a government regulates his
service rights without effecting the basic rights of others, there is no discrimina-
tion against the public in the conferment of such rights on public servants and
there is no exploitation of the public servant in the withdrawal of such rights. But
it would certainly be exploitative of a public servant if any of the rights or benefits
due to them are taken away for not achieving a 'quota of motivation' unless such a
function is witllin the job description of such an official such as, for example the
block extension educator. Family planning should be seen as a means to an
end and not an end in itself. Incentives to motivators or outreach workers may
distort this perception.
41. While a scheme of incentives and disincentives should satisfy legal and
ethical requirements, it happens that certain laws could themselves be an incentive
in moderating fertility, Mention has already been made of laws prohibiting child
labour, which would make the parents think about 'how much- children would
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cost rather than how much they would earn'. Likewise, in traditional societies
which are characterized by son-preference because of inheritance and other rights
conferred on the son (and in that situation procreation goes on atleast till a son is
born), if a law chlnges such discrimination against a daughter, the parents would
be less inclined to procreate till the arrival of a son. In this context, it merits con-
sideration whether the legal framework in India needs revision to change the
traditional attitude of people on 'son-preference', which constitutes a major im.:
pediment to increased family planning practice.
42. A discussion on legal and ethical implications of a scheme of incentives
for fertility control would not be complete without a reference to the interdepen-
dence between the status of women and their fertility. The World Plan of Action
for Women (Mexico, 1975) states: "The sta1us of women and in particular their
educational level whether or not they are gainfully employed the nature of their
employment and tfleir position within the family are all factors that have been found
to influence family size. Conversely, the right of women to decide freely and
responsibly on the number and spacing of their children and to have access to the
informaton and the means to enable them to exercise that right has a decisive
impact on their ability to take advantage of educational and employment oppor-
tunities and to participate fully in community life as responsible citizens". Noting
that the hazards of child-bearing resulted in high rate of maternal mortality and
morbidity, the World Plan of Action called for the removal of all legal social or
financial obstacles to the dissemination of family planning knowledge, means
and services. Also the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of Dis-
crimination against Women has emphasized women's right to family planning and
its contribution to the improvement of her status. Considering that family planning
itself is the starting point of emancipation of women, it would be useful to consider
the type of incentives that would enable (particularly rural women) to exercise
their right to family planning in the socio-cultural milieu in which they live. Em-
ployment opportunities would be an ideal solution. But would they be available
in sufficient quantity in a short time and nearer 'home'? Would education and
vocational training for rural women constitute an essential preparatory step and
an incentive for promoting family planning?
NATURE AND SIZE OF I.NCENTIVES
43. The Task Force identified a four-category target group for incentives com-
prising:
(i) private households (or individual acceptors),
(ii) communities or groups (which attain a certain level of acceptance),
(Hi) change agents (motivators from the public or private sector)
(iv) intermediaries (stockists and distributors of contraceptives and service
providers) .
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The suggested scheme is :
Incentives 1.0 acceptors
I
I
II
Individual Community Group
I I
I
I
Below General Rural
I
I
Employees
poverty
Commu- of
line
nity & Govt.
Pancha-
I
yat
Employees
of organis-
ed ~ndustry
and planta-
tion
I
Tribal
Groups
Incentives to intermediaries
I
I
Motiva-
tors
I
Public
I
Services
I
I
Doctors
I
Supplies
I
I
Stockists
I
Areas
I
I
District
and
Private
!
II
I
Parame- Distribu- Block
dies
tors
I
PHC
Regarding incentives to motivators, there were divergent views in the Task Force.
One view was that under incentives functionaries would become mercenaries and
resort to coercivf! methods. Contrarily, it was suggested that incentives to moti-
vators are more important than incentives to acceptors but such incentives should
be given only after the follow-up of the acceptors.
44. Any schem.~ of incentives and disincentives to be successful has not only to
be legal and ethically justified but should also be economically viable and capable
of implementation in a limited resource situation. Theoretically, the options can
range from "deveiopment" as a "fertility moderator" to a small monetary incentives
to an acceptor b<~lowthe poverty line. Though it is possible that development
measures do incr,~ase motivation for small families, the critical question is "what
are the development thresholds." A study* in Egypt (population 41 million)
calculated that in order to reach the threshold level of ecoRomic development that
would by itself reduce fertility, the per capita income has to increase, to about $900
(Rs. 8,400), whicl1 is more than six times the per capita income (Rs. 1,380) of an
Indian in 1979-80. It is neither possible to increase national income by these
proportions in the short run through development nor do we have time to wait
until the slow pro(:ess of development works out its beneficial effects.
45. This is not to under-rate the importance of socia-economic development
in moderating fertility. What is needed is that our direct approach to reducing
excessive fertility through incentives must themselves be development-oriented
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and distributIve. People would want to reduce the size of their families, if they
have new opportunities, new expectations and new hopes. In other words,
development' projects and programmes which improve the physical quality of
life and simultaneously increase the demand for family size limitations are the type
of incentives which have optimum features and create a compelling environment
for natural acceptance of family planning. These criteria are likely to be met in
community-incentive scheme and group-1ncentive scheme. The Task Force
also considered it a wholesome idea to link community incentives to basic develop-
mental issues a1d infrastructural facilities. Such community incentives, in their
view, could appropriately lead to social targeting in family planning. Area based
schemes such as employment guarantee schemes and food-for-work programmes
could be linked with incentives. Such large incentive models consider family
planning as part of an overall strategy of social and economic transformation.
Development incentives to PHC, Zilla Parishad and Panchayat based on their
performance w(tuld have a favourable effect on the programme. The Indian
Association of;Jarliamentarians (IAPPD) recommended incentives to be given
in the form of accelerated development to localities/communities for collective
effort and achievement in the sphere of family planning.
46. Each identifiable community such as village panchayats, urban wards,
workers' colony, etc. could be informed about the incentives that would be avail-
able to the community if they are able to achieve the prescribed level of perfor-
mance in terms of proportion of couple protected through modern methods of
contraception or the number of births in the community. Once the base-line data
. is available, such goals can be easily set consistent with the state level demo-
graphic goal. Community incentives besides securing community participation
in the programme would thus also prepare the ground for a community level
"popUlation planning". The Task Force recommended that voluntary bodies
need to be provided two types of incentives-a doctor to render services and money
for supplies. Likewise, an incentive scheme for self-employed was also suggested.
47. The hard demographic fact of India is that time already lost in fertility
reduction makes the task increasingly difficult in future. Because they are urgent,
far-reaching and pervasive, solution to population problem must involve sQveral
Ministries. Fertility reduction could be more rapid and successful if population-
influencing policies in education, health and sanitation, food and nutrition, social
welfare, transport and communication could be brought into "convergence" at
the area or community level through suitable community-incentive schemes.
Fortunately, it so happens that these very factors also influence the rate of popula-
tion growth. Each of the Ministries concerned with population planning could
suggest suitable incentive schemes as part of its area approar.h to planning or
under the minimum needs programme. Illustrative of these types of incentives
are construction of rural roads, digging of wells, provision of pump sets, establish-
ment of PHCs, primary school, co-operative mmketing facility etc. The Task
Force endorsed this suggestion and emphasized that population issues need the
involvement of every agency of the Government and that it was only through multi-
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departmental E,ffort that benefits could be beamed to the impoverished segments,
who also need family planning services.
48. Another critical area is the quantum of incentives. These considerations
do not apply to group incentives because such incentives which are asset-forming
would depend on the nature of the group, the size of the group, the location and
the priority neE,ds. What should be the quantum of incentive to individual accep-
tors? Do monetary incentives in the range of Rs. 100-200 for an acceptor of
sterilisation (a~; at present) attract freely the acceptors or such incentives require
backing throuuh official pressure or persuasion which affects voluntary accep-
tance. To get over this undesirable trend, what is the level to which the compensa-
tion must be raised and how is the level to be determined. If we consider sterilisa-
tion (in which the acceptor decides to forego his interest in additional children
as old-age sec'Jrity), should the incentives for sterilisation be adequate to provide
such security E,ither fully or partly. Another concept is the value of a prevented
birth. HowevEr, estimates have varied over a wide margin from Rs. 690 to
Rs. 7,800*. If we accept an intermediate figure of Rs. 4,000 as an incentive to
an acceptor of sterilisation which is the method with 100 per cent effectiveness
in preventing a birth, and apply it to the level of 4 million sterilisations which is the
minimum annual number required to take us to the demographic goal of NRR = 1
by 2000 AD (with other methods having the major share of acceptors) the funds
required for the incentive scheme (for sterilisation acceptors) would be Rs. 1,600
crores annually while the family welfare budget for the entire Sixth Five Year Plan
is Rs. 1,010 c 'ores. When investments of these orders are contemplated, the
questions that arise are:
(i) are they a proper means of securing distributive justice?
(ii) would investments of the same magnitude in other than family planning,
especially in health and literacy be more beneficial?
(iii) if such investments are made in family planning for improving educa-
tional and motivational programmes or in 'flooding' rural areas with
contraceptives would we get better acceptance rates?
(iv) do high incentives apart from adding to the cost, take the. family
planning programme out of context of an integrated approach and family
welfc're?
(v) can high incentives be maintained as a long-term policy?
Ready answers 'to these critical questions on investment options are not available.
Unfortunately in population studies 'controlled experimentation' is not easy. Such
answers have to be based on 'experimental designs' involving large population
segments. The Task Force also observed that high financial inputs in incentives
would have to be considered against the economic consequences and altQl'nate
uses of scarce resources such as, for example, in promoting literacy among women.
* Quoted by F'eedman and Berelson in Studies in Family Planning, Vol. 7, No.1.
January 1976.
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49. In the absence of knowledge about the alternative investment options, the
only course left is to assume that cost-effectiveness of high incentives may not be
high and choose a modest figure for one-time monetary incentive for sterilisation
acceptor as Rs. 500 and apply it selectively to those who have only two children.
It is also to be corlsidered whether such incentives may be paid in cash or linked
with a scheme of social security. For example, the Finance Minister had announc-
ed in the 1982-83 budget a social security certificate scheme for persons of small
me1;lnsunder which an individual in the age group 18-45 can invest upto Rs. 5,000
which will triple in 10 years. This is a scheme which combines thrift with security
as the certificates provide social security for the family. The certificate will be in
denominations of Rs. 500 and Rs. 1,000. Those who undergo sterilisation after
two children can he given a certificate for Rs. 500 or if they purchase a certificate
for Rs. 1,000, the Government could contribute Rs. 500. Schemes of this type
such as reduced J:remium for sterilisation acceptors (with two children) on Postal
Life Insurance Policies or enhanced maturity value are already under consideration
of Government in the case of Central Government employees. The idea behind
such social security schemes is that they:
(1) do not constitute undue allurement;
(2) prevent the incentive money from being squandered by diverting them
to 10n~l-term family security;
(3) are leSB amendable to shady dealings which affect cash transactions.
The Task Force while accepting the figure of Rs. 500 as cash incentive suggested
. that the scheme could concentrate on the three lowest deciles of population. This
would be attractive as it represents a lumpsum equivalent of about 3 or 4 months
salary earnings of a person in this group. Also, while individual incentives in
cash may attract the poor, social security schemes and deferred payments are
preferable.
50. While individual one-time cash incentives applied to the general public
need reconsideration in the light of the observations made above, there is a case
for such incentivEis in increasing the acceptor rate in organised communities such
as industrial workers or plantation labour where such schemes have operated.
TATA offered Rs. 400 for employees or spouses for sterilisation and Rs. 200 for
non-employees.
51. In the case of monetary incentives for sterilisation one point worth noting is
that the method is female-oriented with a ratio of 1 :4 between vasectomy and
tubectomy since 1977-78. Is it desirable to shift the contraception burden as
far as this method is concerned towards males by offering them a higher incentive?
There was divided opinion in the Task Force on this subject. The need to retain
the initiative of women in sterilisation and the possibility of an overall drop in
sterilisation acceptors arising from the shift constituted one set of opinion while
others felt that family planning should be a shared responsibility and that techno-
logical limitations in tubectomy in rural areas favoured concentration on vasectomy.
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The Indian Association of Parliamentarians (IAPPD) has recommended a differen-
tial structure of incentives with higher incentives for men.
52. A critical question in introducing a scheme of individual incentives is the
size of the family. Though a two-child norm is suggested by the long term demo-
graphic gcal, it would be difficult to adopt this norm right away till an attitude for
this norm is built. The distribution1\\' of births by birth order in 1978 shows that
56 per cer t of the births in rural areas were of third and higher order. No doubt
high parity births are coming down - births of fourth and higher order which
constituted 47 per cent in 972 declined to 39 percent in 1978 in rural areas and
from 44 per cent to 33 per cent in urban areas. If the incentive schemes succeed
in preventi 19 even the fourth and higher order births the number of births in a
year could be reduced by one-third. If a two-child norm itself is desired, differen-
tials may have to be introduced in the incentives. The Task Force also suggested
a scheme (If differential incentives for one, two and three children as this had a
communication element in its 'preference scale'.
53. Another type of individual incentive sc.heme of a long-term nature is the
defened payment scheme. The United Planters Association of India (UPASI)
had integrated family planning with comprehensive labour welfare scheme (1978).
As part of the scheme. they paid Rs. 5 per month as no-birth-bonus into the bene-
ficiaries' account and the accumulated amount wal? paid when the women reached
age 45. If imy of the beneficiariEls had a third or fourth order of birth then deduc-
tions were effected from the bonus amount with a total forfeiture for the firth birth
Such deductions are not a denial of workers' right because the bonus amount from
which the dllductions are made is not a part of wages but an ex-gratia payment.
The advantane of such deferred payment schemes is that they could be applied to
contraception through temporary methods or spacing methods. such as IUD.
condom and oral pills. Also such schemes can be monitored because the bene-
ficiaries would periodically have a medical check up. Since more than half of the
acceptors required to take the nation towards its demographic goal of a birth rate
of 21 per tho Jsand by 2000 AD may be using spacing methods (in which there is
no fear elemlmt as in sterilisation), deferred payment incentives have an appeal
and scope. The Task Force emphasized that incentives should not be confined
to sterilisatio/l acceptors as spacing methods are even more important as they
enable family limitations at an early stage and hence more consequential for
fertility reduction. Also deferred payment enables continued control over the
fertility behavour of the beneficiary. While in the case of organised groups like
industrial workers. public sector employees, members of co-operatives etc., the
operation of deferred schemes may be easy, in the case of general public suitable
organisational structure may have to be created.
54. Another scheme of incentives which may be applied to those who limit their
families to two children is the provision of educational bond for the parents. Under
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the bond the State may undertake to provide educational facilities or may subsidize
the education of two children.
55. A green card for "two-child family" may be supplied to the mother or father
to get priority in mudical attention in government hospitals, in allotment of houses
or house sites, in providing electricity or water connections, in allotment of scooter
etc. Indeed, the possession of the green card should progressively improve the
social status and rtlSpect for such families. The demonstration effect of such
benefits derived from the green card could be an important source of motivation
to those who coma in contact with such families. The Task Force agreed that
non-monetary incentives such as treating an acceptor as a VIP in the provision of
social services wolild have a profound demonstration effect.
56. An elaborate list of incentives for family planning that would fit into the
socio-economic development pattern and in particular the basic minimum needs
approach could bo prepared by different ministries for 'consideration and co-
ordination by the Planning Commission. A long term reduction of family size
can come only out of a perception of well-being which in turn requires that basic
needs (drinking w3ter, food, health and housing) are met. A list of incentives
and disincentives that could be considered by individual Ministries to promote
the adoption of a Bmall family norm is given under Recommendation.
RECOMMENDATIONS ON INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES
FOR PROMOTING FAMILY PLANNING
1. With a population base of 700 million in 1982 which could grow to a billion
by 2000 AD even with a 2 per cent annual growth, the task of achieving the
demographic goal of Net Reproduction Rate of One by 2000 AD for the
entire countty is a grim challenge. The time factor definitely compounds
our population problem both quantitatively and qualitatively and we there-
fore need a stronger and pervasive family planning programme so that contra-
ceptive prott:ction is made available to an average annual increase of 3.5
million couples.
2. It is necessalY to go "beyond" supplying information, contraception material
and family ~llanning services to individual couples, by adoption of policies
by governmE:nt and non-government bodies which·seek directly to influence
the fertility behaviour of families through a comprehensive scheme ()~ incen-
tives and di!,incentives, so that people can see an 'immediate benefit' from
family planning.
3. To the extent that a scheme of incentives works efficiently, there may not be
need for introducing disincentives on a large scale. Yet some specific
disincentive! applicable to individuals on a moderate scale and consistent
with legal and ethical requirements seem to be justified to create an image
of comprehensiveness in the strategy and convey the serious intent of govern-
ment in handling the population problem within the prescribed time-frame
of 2000 AD,
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4. A policy o{incentives and disincentives as applicable to individuals has legal
and ethical implications. It has to recognize, on the one hand, the right of
the couple to decide freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their
childmn and on the other, the obligation of a Welfare State to· improve the
physical quality of life of the people. The State has a responsibility both
to the individual and to the society. While procreative freedom is a huma n
right 1he consequences of reproduction (such as the care of the child) are
increasingly socialized and become a social burden. The State in its en-
deavour to reach a level of development necessary for the welfare of the
peopl,~ has therefore a responsibility to modify the conditions under which
couplHs make choices about child bearing.
5. Individual freedom of the citizen of today cannot be the only ethical imperativ
of a ~opulation control policy. While such a freedom has to be tempered
by the concern for others, a child's right not to be born to a life of degradation
must be respected equally. A State can therefore take pre-emptive action
to pre'lent high parity births and 'irresponsible' fertility behaviour in terms of
societal norms. It would appear to be a minimum restriction on individual
freedom if the government were to build gradually a positive attitude
towards a small family norm by a judicious use of incentives and
disincontives.
6, To w(lrk a scheme of incentives and disincentives in relation to individual
families, government is urged to publicize a family-size policy as suggested
below.
Goverr ment to announce
a scheme of incentives.
IndividlJal families restrict-
ing to ~ chidren get incen-
tives.
Government appeals to
people not to exceed
three in national interest.
Reduced incentives are
offered.
Individual families who
d? not comply face dis-
incentives.
Four Children and
above.
Government with-
draws incentives
applicable to the
first two children
and applies dis-
incentives.
AdmittEldly, there would be initially imJjlementation problems and possibly
even 1i1igation; but once the government's intentions are announced and
the scheme becomes operational from a prescribed future date, it would
itself hllve a tremendous educative and motivative value and the problem
areas could get narrowed progressively.
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7. Stagnant economy and inequitable distribution of income would become
permanent lInless we act vigorously to reduce the growth of population.
If we hesitatl~ now to introduce 'soft' measures, the need for harder measures,
a decade fro 11 now may become inevitable.
8. Incentives and disincentives should be more personal to the parent and
should not dreetly affect the rights of children. It is not only intentions but
also consequences which have to be kept in view and emphasis should there-
fore be, as hr as possible, on affirmative action by the State with reaso-
nable margin,
9. An individual one time cash incentive scheme appears to have a better justi-
fication for acceptors of sterilisation because it being a terminal method the
couples are required to make a clear decision about the size of the family and
being a surgical method, it requires rest and after care. The incentive money
needs to be increased to Rs. 500 and paid in cash to the three lowest deciles
of population while for others it may be linked to the soc;:ialsecurity scheme
announced in the 1982-83 Budget.
10. It may be impractical to have a tight criterion of two-child norm rightaway
because morl~ than half of the births are of the third and higher birth order.
A scheme 01 differential incentives for two and three-child families may
have to be introduced so that the communication element in the 'preference
scale' may usher in the two-child norm progressively. An incentive of Rs. 500
for sterilisati(ln acceptor with two children and Rs. 300 for acceptor with
three childrer could be effective.
11. For regular E,mployees who undergo sterilisation after two children, there
could be alternative types of monetary incentives in lieu of lumpsum payment
in the form 0\\::
(i) advance increlTlent (s) in salary,
(ii) ten per :;ent increase in pension,
(iii) educatic nal allowances for the two children,
(iv) lower interest and preference in loans for housing or for purchase of
transport,
(v) prolonged maternity leave with pay for the mother.
12. The family panning programme needs to be strengthened in permanent
and even more in spacing methods as the latter enable family limitation at a
younger and Ilence more consequential age for fertility reduction. From the
point of view of cost-effecitiveness, verifiability and evaluation, individual
one-time incentives may apply to sterilisation but deferred incentive schemes
are ideal for tumporary methods as it enables continued check over the non-
pregnancy status of the beneficiary. Adopting the experience of United
Planters Assol:iation of India (UPASI), a certain amount of money could be
'deposited evelY month in an account to be opened in the name of the bene-
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ficiary of spacing method and the accumulated amount given when the
women reaches 45 years. If the beneficiary has a third child the accumula-
tion is reduced by half and in the event of a fourth child, totallY forfeited.
13. Defened incentive schemes are suitable for regular employees of the public
sector. organised industries, plantations, mines, co-operative societies and
educational institutions. Bonus to female employees who do not utiJise their
maternity leave for a certain number of years, is another effective scheme to
delay the first birth or space the second.
14. Besid>~smonetary incentives to the public for adopting the two-child norm,
there could be several non-monetary incentives which would have a high
demonstration effect. Examples of such incentives are:
(i) provision of educational bond to parents who limit to two children,
(ii) preference for 50 per cent of seats in all educational institutions to the
first and second child in a family,
(Hi) preference in allotment in public housing projects,
(iv) preference in loans for establishing small scale industries in rural areas.
15. Every family adopting the two-child norm may be issued a GREEN CARD
which would entitle it to get priority in medical attention in government
hospitals, in provision of electricity or water connections, or claim any of the
incentives applicable to them. The demonstration effect of benefits derived
from the green card could be an important source of motivation to those who
come in contact with such families. Indeed, the possession of the green
card :;hould progressively become a status symbol in society and build gra-
dually a contracepting society in which family planning becomes a way of
life and not an ad-hoc response to an official programme.
16. Besides incentives to individual acceptors, two other categories for whom
incentives could be offered are the intermediaries (viz. the stockists and
distrihutors of contraceptives and providers of service such as doctors
and paramedics) and the change agents or motivators from the private and
public: sector. While incentives to private change agents could be offered
after a follow-up of the acceptors, any incentive to public functi9J1aries
should guard against their becoming mercenaries and agents of coercion and
, corruption.
17. In thl~ Indian context, there is scope for both individual and community,
grou~1 or area incentives in promoting family planning. A long-term reduc-
tion ill family size can come only out of a perception of well-being, which in
turn Iequires that basic needs are met. What is necessary is that our direct
approach to reducing excessive fertility of communities through incentives
shoul1 thems.elves be development-oriented, asset forming and distributive
so thift they could exercise a synergistic influence on fertility by creating a
compelling environment for natural acceptance of family planning. The
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target appr03ch to family planning and the annual level of performance
prescribed pe' thousand population would be advantageous in implementing
an incentive scheme at area level. Each identifiable community such as
village panchayat, urban ward, workers' colony etc. could be informed about
the incentive!: that would be available to the community if they were able to
achieve a prEscribed level of performance in terms of proportion of couples
effectively protected or the number of births in the community in a year.
Community incentives are listed in Recommendation 25.
18. Community incentives besides securing community involvement in family
planning can also prepare the ground for community level "population
planning" using all the contraception methods available.
19. Population issues cannot be a departmental activity confined to the Ministry
of Health; they require multi-departmental effort. Fertility reduction could
be more rapid and successful if population-influencing policies in education;
health and sclnitation, food and nutrition; social welfare and women's status
and transpor: and communication could be brought into 'convergence' at
the area or c'Jmmunity level through suitable incentives schemes of different
ministries (Which are indicated in Recommendation 25).
20. Development-oriented incentive schemes of different Ministries for promot-
ing family r,lanning may be co-ordinated by the Planning Commission
through a "Population Cell" and specific funds earmarked for the purpose.
21. Voluntary ornanisation (NGO) need to be involved in a big way as incentive
schemes operated by them could be more innovative and evoke better res-
ponse from people than government schemes. All the voluntary organisa-
tions who arE!involved in family planning may be asked to prepare innovative
incentive schemes compatible with their service delivery systems.
22. Voluntary women's organizations involved in family planning may be urged
to formulate suitable incentive schemes (particularly income-generating
programmes), that could be operated through local or area level women's
instiutions. Such incentives may also be useful in mobilising rural women
both for pronoting family planning among them and in extension activities.
23. Some of the disincentives which are more personal to the parent and affect
the child mirlimally are:
(i) for regular employees no maternity leave benefits for the third or
subseqllent child,
(ii) low pric1rityin admission of third and subsequent children in educa-
tional institutions,
(iii) cancellcltion of educational bond given to the first two children if the
parent has a fourth child,
(iv) a graded increase in accouchment fee charged in maternity hospitals
depend ng on family size (beyond two) and family income,
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(v) low priority in housing in public housing projects for parents ith more
than three children,
(vi) IClw prioritY in grant of loans by banks for any purpose if the pplicant
has more than three children,
(vii) fClr public servants, low priority in allotment of residential acc
tion for parents having more than three children,
(viii) fer public servants, restriction of free medical attention 0 medical
reimbursement to the first three children.
.
! 24. There are many prerequisites and corequisites for a successful )heme of
incentives and disincentives. These are:
(i) th 3 scheme should be prospective in its operation and a f rm date
frc'm which the scheme operates must be announced. Disin entives
should not affect the children born before this date,
(ii) thll scheme should be responsive to development needs and
to local autonomy, structure and values,
(iii) thE,reis need for an efficient and incorruptible management, .
I
(iv) it is necessary to have a good system of birth registration fo~ which
facilities already exist under the Registration of Births & Dea~hs Act,
1~rn
.
(v) much depends on the intrinsic appeal of the scheme to couples vary-
in{) social and economic conditions. It therefore requires a go d and
easily accessible communication base, with an open atmosph re and
continued dialogue so that people understand how family plan ing is
beneficial and is their normal duty in the national interest. Com-
munication Strategy should also tell the people that incentives a d dis-
incE,ntives are not meant to prod them into accepting family pi nning
but to create the circumstances ill which they could appreci te the
benl3fits of a small family while the freedom of option is still befor them.
(vi) an incentive scheme would be successful only within the fram -work
of credible family planning services, in terms of easy acce ibility,
effectiveness, safety and acceptability. For this, contraceptive s pplies
and servicesmay be included in the basic minimum needs of the p ple~
(vii) in designing and implementing community incentives, the p ssible
exist9nce of power groups and chances of incentives getting sewed
in dwelopmental distribution should be recognised and saf uards
provided.
I
25. Each Min stry could formulate a set of incentives (and disincentives that
would fit into the socio-economic development pattern and in part cular
the basic minimum needs and promote simultaneously the adoption of a
small family norm. An illustrative, but by no means an exhaustive I st of
communit}' or area incentives for achieving prescribed level of family pia ning
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performanc:e (Le above 35% couple protection or less than 25 birth~ per
thousand~lopulation)* is given:
(i) Mhiintry of Agriculture and Rurar Health
a. 0, a priority basis improve infrastructure facilities by providinq rural
roads, marketing facilities and co.operatives on a priority ba~is in
eli';Jible areas.
b. 01 a priority ba"sisimprove water resources and small scale irri~ation
facilities in eligible areas.
c. 01 a priority basis provide agriculture and animal husbandry e~ten-
silln service facility ineligible areas.
d. Plovide fertilisers, agriculture implements seeds etc. at subsi~ized
rate to the 'acceptor group' in the eligible area.
e. Create area Co-operative bank for acceptors in eligible areas.
f. Provide family grants or interest-free loans to eligible famili~s (2
child limit) for developing beehives, chicken, poultry farmin~ and
pig.growing programme.
g. Initiate social forestry scheme.
h. 5ubsdize the establishment of biogas plant.
i. C:>-operatives may be asked to suggest suitable incentive sc~mes
for their members.
(ii) Minil;try of Education
a. Institution of education bond for two-child families.
b. Preferential admission for 50 per cent of seats in educational
institutions to the first two children in a family and low prior~ty in
admission to the third and higher order children.
c. Elitablishment of one-teacher schools in eligible areas on a p~iority
bclsis.
d. Incentives to improve adult and functional literacy in areas wit~ low
purformance (less than 15% couple protection) provided th~ in-
crease their acceptance by 5 per cent annually.
e. Elitablishment of education facilities in urban slums which be~ome
'e!igible'.
(iii) Ministry of Finance
a. A 'cash reward' or 'Community development fund' to communit'es or
punchayats which have attained a couple protection of 30 perl cent.
The funds to be administered by 'acceptor group' could be us.d by
a(:ceptors for income.generating programmes.
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b. A 'trust fund' to be created in poor performance Panchayats (below
15% acceptance) which could be used if the acceptor rate increases
by 5 per cent annually.
c. A concession of Rs. 500 in certificates issued under Social Security
Scheme (1982-83) to anyone of the parents who limit the family
to two through a terminal method (concession reduced to Rs. 300
for three children).
(iv) Dopartment of Personnel
a. 10 per cent increase in pension for public servants who limit their
family to two children.
b. Longer maternity leave with pay to the mother who limits to two
children and loss of entitlement to maternity leave for third and
further children.
c. Advanced increment (s) not exceeding Rs. 50 p.m. and not absorb-
able in future increments to all regular employees of public sector who
limit the family to two by adopting a terminal method.
d. -Obligation on recruitment to public services to limit the family to
J
two-children failing which a reduction in gratuity or pension.
(v) Ministry of Health
a. A 'green card' may be issued to a two-child family when either of
the parents have had sterilisation after the birth of the second child.
The card may be designed in an attractive and displayable form and
wide publicity be given to the benefits derived from such a certificate.
b. Voluntary organisations who have established a good re~ord in
family planning services may be provided two types of incentives
as considered necessary - a doctor to render services and money
for contraceptive supplies or free supplies, to promote the pro-
gramme vigorously.
c. As part of the integrated approach to health and family planning,
successful motivators from voluntary organisations and satisfied
acceptors could be given a packet of "needed medicines and contra-
ceptives" to be sold to the public at the prescribed price and the
supplies replaced freely by government. The packet may also
contain 'Oralyte' (for diarrhoea) and 'antihelminthics (for worm
control).
d. Initiate schemes for providing subsidized sanitary latrines and
community latrines in rural areas as part of parasite-control pro-
,~ramme and use it as entry point to strengthen family planning.
e. Location of sub-centres for primary health care on a priority basis
ineligible areas.
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f. Crganisation of intensive immunisation programmes in urban
sums to focus attention on family planning programme.
g. Provide incentives to promote Nurses' Association for rendering
contraceptive services in their off hours in urban slums and neigh-
bouring rural areas not provided with clinics.
h. Promote community-based distribution system for condoms and
p lis and make them progressively self-reliant for undertaking
d,welopmental and income-generating activities in the community.
i. Incentives to indigenous medical practitioners in rural areas to
undertake contraceptive distribution.
(iv) Ministry of Labour
a. El<pansionof women-preferred industries in rural areas.
b. Organize food-for-work and rural wo'rks programme to build assets
in the form of approach roads, irrigation facilities, water supply etc.,
and involve the participants in family planning.
c. Effective I~gislation on prevention of Child-labour and thus
reducing the undesirable 'benefits' derived from children in their
younger ages.
d. Labour unions and woker groups may be requested to suggest
suitable incentive schemes for organized labour to promote family
planning.
e. Sot up vocational training facilities in the eligible areas or for the
acceptor group.
(vii) Minil.try of Law
a. R'~cognition of family planning as a basic human right (as re-
commended by the Indian Association of Parliamentarians on
Population and Development, May 1981).
b. Rlwision of Laws which discriminate against women to discourage
the traditional preference for sons.
(viii) MiniBtry of Social Welfare
a. E1fective implementation of the law on minimum age at marriage.
b. Elitablish ICDS schemes on a priority basis in eligible areas (this
would indeed be a prerequisite since I CDS inputs would be diluted
if the number of children in the ICDS area increases in an uncon-
trolled manner).
(ix) Mini!itry of Works & Housing
a. Rllservation of 50 per cent of houses in the future Public Housing
Projects to the two-child family in which either of the parents has
accepted a terminal method.
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b. Preference in sanctioning electricity and water connections to two-
child families.
c. Low priority in allotment of residential accommodation to public
servants who exceed the limit of three children.
d. Subsidize the construction of link roads to connect 'eigible areas'
to main roads.
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Members of the Task Force on Incentives and Disincentives which met
on 9th June 19$2:
(1) Mr. Justic:e G. D. Khosla, Member, Governing Board, FPF (Chairman).
(2) Mr. P. P/ldmanabha,Registrar General and Census Commissioner, India,
New Delhi.
(3) Dr. V. R.malingaswami, Director General, Indian Council of Medical
Research, New Delhi.
(4) Dr. V. A. 'ai Panandiker, Director, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi.
(5) Dr. Raj Arole, Director, Comprehensive Health and Family Welfare Scheme,
Jamkhed, Ahmednagar District, Maharashtra.
(6) Dr. P. N. Chuttani, Ex-Director, Rost Graduate Institute of Medical Education
and Reseqrch, Chandigarh.
(7) Prof. J. D. Sethi, Former Member, Planning Commission, New Delhi.
(8) Mr. P. G. Ramachandran, Marketing and Management Expert, New Delhi.
(9) Dr. S M. Shah, Advisor, Programme Evaluation, Planning Commission,
New Deihl
(10) Mr. S. P. Ahuja, President, Centre for Research Planning and Action,
New Delhi.
(11) Prof. R. K. Maru, Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad.
Besides the above, the Foundation had also the benefit of interaction
with a panel of jt.l'ists comprising Mr. N. A. Palkhiwala, Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, Dr.
L. M. Singhvi, Mra. S. M. Bhandare, and Mr. J. Dadachanji.
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Disincenti'les applicable to public servants
(1) Disciplinary action proposed to be taken against public servants failing to
achi !lve the quota of motivation for sterilisation etc. allotted to them.
(2) Grart of Transfer T.A. to public servants upto 2/3 children only.
(3) Free medical treatment or reimbursement of medical expenses to public
servents limited upto 2/3 children only.
(4) Reirrbursement of educational fee to public servants limited upto 3 children
only.
(5) Gran t of maternity leave to female public servants limited upto 2/3 children
only.
(6) DeniClI of encashment of earned leave to public servants having more than
2/3 children only.
(7) DeniClI of Government residential accommodation or payment of enhanced
rent by public servants having more than 2/3 children.
(8) No h4)use-rent allowance to public. servants having more th~n 3 children.
(9) Denial of all loans and advances to public servants having more than 2/3
childr,tn.
(10) Denia I of annual increment to public servants having more than 3 children.
(11) No allotment of houses built by the Housing Board or L.I.C. or other similar
bodie~ or under M.I.G. Scheme or Rent Control Act to Public Servants
havinu more than 2/3 children.
DisincentivEIS applicable to the public
(12) No appointment to public services for persons having more than three
childrEn.
(13) Appointment to any public service contingent upon signing a declaration
to limit the birth of children to 2 only.
(14) If a pltrson gf the eligible category does not undergo sterilization after
the binh of upto the third child, he will not be -
a) givEn any loan
b) granted a licence for fire arms or allowed to renew such a licence
c) allotted a fair price shop
* Rearranged from the list given in pp 168, 169 of 'Policy implications of Incentives anll
Disincentives', 1.78 - a joint publication of FPF and Centre for Policy Re"search.
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5 Pages 41-50 |
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5.1 Page 41 |
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d) allotted a house or plot of land
e) entitled to free medical treatment at Government hospitals
f) granted educational concessions or scholarships except merit scholar-
ships
g) granted any facilities offered by the Harijan and Social Welfare Depart-
ment.